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This paper sets up a small open economy general equilibrium model operating in a monetary 
union. Exogenous oil-price shocks affecting the modelled economy are alleviated by 
introducing a pro-cyclical excise duty tax rule on oil prices. The paper provides a model-based 
theoretical background for studying a response of fiscal policy that is able to curb the negative 
effects of volatile global oil prices on inflation. Against this backdrop, we estimate the key 
parameters of the DSGE model and simulate different responses of the fiscal policy tax rule, 
based on different values of the responsiveness of the excise duty parameter. 
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Oil prices have always been a hot topic amongst policy makers as well as entrepreneurs and 
households. Fluctuations of oil prices can have big effects on the economies and their monetary 
(and fiscal) policy activity as they can substantially affect the inflation rates and real output. 
Despite the importance of oil-price shocks declined in the post-1990 period, oil prices have 
risen in years following the outbreak of the financial crisis in the United States and the European 
Union. Only recently, as prospects of a possible China cool-down in its economic activity, it 
forced oil prices to decline drastically and making new ground for further oil-price shocks in 
the future. In order to tackle this problem, monetary authorities rely on complex dynamic macro 
models, with which they try to predict different economic outcomes. 
 
Several studies have investigated effects that oil-price shocks have on an economy. The wide 
fluctuations in oil prices in recent years have spur new research agendas that try to assess the 
effects of oil-price shocks on the main macroeconomic variables. Despite a relatively small 
share in the overall consumption basket, these shocks can significantly affect households and 
firms' decisions via rising costs1, as oil prices usually display larger volatility in comparison to 
other HICP components. In general, the latest studies have used models to decompose direct 
effects of oil-price shocks on output and other economic variables, from those generated by the 
endogenous monetary policy response (Hamilton 1983; Bernanke, Gertler and Watson 1997; 
Leduc and Sill 2001; Hamilton and Herrera 2004; Herrera and Pesavento 2007; Lippi and Nobili 
2009; Anzuini, Pagano and Pisani 2013). However, from studies, that only apply the reduced-
form coefficients in VAR-type of models, it is difficult to disentangle the overall contribution 
                                                 
1 Increased oil prices increase the cost of inputs in the firms' production process. Firms can either lower their profit 
margin on their output goods, or can raise the price of their output goods. The households, on the other hand, can 




of the monetary policy, and thus study oil-price shock effects in more detail. This can be done 
by developing more complex macroeconomic models, a characteristic that DSGE models have. 
Against this backdrop, a small open economy DSGE model is developed, following the works 
of Medina and Soto (2005), Hongzhi (2010), and Forni, Gerali, Notarpietro and Pisani (2012), 
where the difference between oil and non-oil goods are explicitly modelled. Consistently with 
empirical evidence, the assumption is that crude oil is imported from the rest of the world.  
 
The main contribution of the paper is the following. We follow a Medina and Soto (2005) type 
of model setting, but we refrain from it in two important aspects. First, we extend the model 
with a complete government spending block that provides a background for the implementation 
of the excise duty tax rule.2 By doing this, the government can offset the negative effects of oil-
price shocks on inflation by lowering the excise duty tax rate when oil prices increase, and vice 
versa. 
 
Second, we try to fill the gap by studying the effects of oil-price shocks on a small open 
economy model integrated in a single monetary union, namely euro area. In our case, Slovenia 
is a typical example based on the above-mentioned characteristics. It has no oil-producing 
capacities; therefore all of its oil goods are imported. Consequently, it can be strongly affected 
by the fluctuations in world prices of oil. 
 
The structure of the model follows a standard New Keynesian framework with frictions such 
as Calvo pricing (1983) and Calvo wage setting equation introduced by Erceg, Henderson and 
                                                 
2 Excise duty is a tax on consumption. In Slovenia, the system and obligation of paying the excise duty are regulated 
by the Excise Duty Act which is harmonized with the EU legislation. It was first introduced on July 1st 1999. The 
excise duty tax in Slovenia is payable for the following goods released for consumption in the territory of the 
Republic of Slovenia: alcohol and alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, energy products and electricity (Ministry 
of Finance, 2016; Ministry of Finance, 2017). The government can act counter-cyclical to the dynamics oil prices 
and accommodate the rate of the excise duties on oil prices in order to decrease the pressure on the overall inflation. 
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Levin (2000), and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005).3 For the purpose of simulating a 
single monetary union the euro area interest rate is modelled in a Taylor type rule setting (Taylor 
1993) with the addition of a risk-premium on the home interest rate that allows for deviations 
of the domestic interest rate from the (riskless) euro area interest rate (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 
2003). We assume that the domestic economy's size is negligible, so its specific economic 
fluctuations have no influence on other euro area macroeconomic aggregates. 
 
As commonly done in the DSGE literature, a number of parameters are calibrated from the 
outset, and are not included in the estimation process. However, some key structural parameters 
of the modelled economy are estimated following a Bayesian approach as in Smets and Wouters 
(2003), Adolfson et al. (2005), and Christoffel, Coenen and Warne (2008). With the estimated 
model we simulate the response of the main macroeconomic variables to an oil-price shock. 
 
The results show that global oil-price shocks can have large effects on the Slovene economy. 
The fiscal policy authority has the power to offset the pressure that the oil-price shocks have on 
the overall inflation by counter-cyclically regulating the excise duty tax rate on oil goods. 
However, this comes at a cost. Decreased excise duty tax income decreases the government 
spending and increases the budget deficit, if the government chooses not to decrease its 
spending one to one with the decrease in excise duty tax income. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a concise structure of the DSGE 
model. Section 3 discusses the calibration of the model, while Section 4 presents the results of 
                                                 
3 Blanchard and Galí (2007) argue that adding frictions (price and wage rigidities) into a dynamic model provides 
a more realistic normative implications, and a better interpretation for the dynamic inflation-unemployment 
relation found in the data.  
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the estimation. Section 5 provides impulse response functions and historical decomposition. 






In the economy there is a continuum of households indexed by 𝑖 𝜖 (0,1). In time 𝑡 a household 
gains utility from consumption, 𝐶𝑡(𝑖), and leisure, 1 − 𝐿𝑡(𝑖). The 𝑖-th household therefore 
follows its lifetime utility function: 
 
𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽𝑡∞𝑡=0 [ln(𝐶𝑡(𝑖) − ℎ𝐶𝑡−1(𝑖)) − 𝜉𝑡𝑙1+𝜛 𝐿𝑡1+𝜛(𝑖)]      (1) 
 
where variables 𝐶𝑡(𝑖) and 𝐿𝑡(𝑖) present consumption and quantity of work effort of a particular 
household. The parameter 0 < 𝛽 < 1 is the discount factor of households. We assume that 
households value the current consumption more than the future one. The parameter 0 < 𝜛 <∞ is the inverse of the elasticity of work effort with respect to the marginal disutility of labour 
(Frisch elasticity parameter). We allow for habit persistence in preferences by defining ℎ𝐶𝑡−1(𝑖), where the parameter 0 < ℎ < 1 determines the degree of habit persistence.4 Variable 𝜉𝑡𝑙 is denoted as a labour supply shock.5 
 
                                                 
4 Introducing habit persistence into the model is intended to better match the data since the response of consumption 
to expansionary shocks is hump-shaped, and as the peak of the response can occur several quarters after the induced 
shock. Such a response is harder to replicate in the absence of habit formation (Ravn et al., 2008). Habit persistence 
and both, price and wage rigidities, are also modelled in the Medina and Soto (2005) paper. 
5 All shocks in the model follow an exogenous 𝐴𝑅(1) process given by the following representation 𝜉𝑡 =(1 − 𝜌𝜉)?̅? + 𝜌𝜉𝜉𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡𝜉 , where 𝜀𝑡𝜉~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. , 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜉2). 
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Since households are identical ex ante, they face the same budget constraint in each period 
given by the expression: 
 𝐵𝑡(𝑖)𝑅𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡∗(𝑖)𝑅𝑡∗Θ ( 𝐵𝑡∗𝑃𝑡𝑋𝑋𝑡) = 𝐵𝑡−1(𝑖)+𝐵𝑡−1∗ (𝑖) + (1 − 𝜏𝐿)𝑊𝑡(𝑖)𝐿𝑡(𝑖) + Π𝑡(𝑖) + 𝑇𝑅𝑡(𝑖) − (1 + 𝜏𝑡𝐶)𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡(𝑖)  (2) 
 
Variable 𝐵𝑡∗ denotes the holdings of one-period foreign (euro area) riskless bonds, while 𝐵𝑡 
denotes the holdings of one-period domestic bonds that can be issued by the domestic 
government. The nominal interest rates of bonds prevail at the time when the decision is taken, 
by 𝑅𝑡∗ and 𝑅𝑡, respectively. The assumption of the existence of a full set of contingent bonds 
ensures that consumption of all households is the same, independently of the labour income 
they receive each period. The variable Π𝑡 denotes dividend profits of households from domestic 
firms. The variable 𝑊𝑡 is the nominal wage set by a household, while 𝑇𝑅𝑡 are the capita lump-
sum net transfers from the government. The parameter 𝜏𝐿 is the income tax rate and is assumed 
to be constant over time. On the opposite side, we assume a time-varying value added tax on 
consumption, 𝜏𝑡𝐶 .6 Each time a domestic household borrows from abroad, it must pay a premium 
over the international price of external bonds, denoted as Θ(𝐵𝑡∗ 𝑃𝑡𝑋𝑋𝑡⁄ ) (Schmitt-Grohé and 
Uribe, 2003). In comparison to the Medina and Soto (2005), the parametrization of the function Θ depends only of risk premium and not the nominal exchange rate as well. This is due to the 
fact, that we model a small open economy operating in a monetary union. In the steady state, 
for Θ holds 
 
                                                 
6 Following Almeida (2009) we set 𝑃𝑡𝑛𝑢𝑚 = (1 + 𝜏𝑡𝐶)𝑃𝑡  as the numeraire for converting nominal variables to real. 
It is the after tax price of private consumption good. 
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Θ ( 𝐵∗𝑃𝑋𝑋) = Θ̅, and Θ′( 𝐵∗𝑃𝑋𝑋)Θ( 𝐵∗𝑃𝑋𝑋) 𝐵∗𝑃𝑋𝑋 = 𝜚        (3) 
 
The parameter 𝜚 is the elasticity parameter of the upward sloping supply of international funds, 
while 𝑃𝑋𝑋 is the steady state value of exports and 𝐵∗ stands for the steady state for net foreign 
asset position. 
 
We assume that households are the same, so 𝐶𝑡(𝑖) = 𝐶𝑡 holds. The consumption bundle of the 𝑖-th household is given by the following function 
 
𝐶𝑡 = [𝜔𝑂𝐶1𝜈𝑂𝐶(𝑂𝑡𝐶)𝜈𝑂𝐶−1𝜈𝑂𝐶 + (1 − 𝜔𝑂𝐶)(𝐶𝑡𝐶)𝜈𝑂𝐶−1𝜈𝑂𝐶 ] 𝜈𝑂𝐶𝜈𝑂𝐶−1     (4) 
 
where the variable 𝑂𝑡𝐶 represents oil consumption, and the variable 𝐶𝑡𝐶  represents the 
consumption of every other (non-oil) good. The parameter 𝜈𝑂𝐶 is the elasticity of substitution 
between oil and non-oil consumption, while the parameter 𝜔𝑂𝐶 is the share of oil in the overall 
consumption bundle. Further on, the consumption of every other good, 𝐶𝑡𝐶 , or the so-called core 
consumption good, again, represents an additional consumption bundle that is made of 
domestically produced good, and foreign imported goods. The core consumption bundle is then 
given by   
 




where the parameter 𝜈𝐹𝐻 is the elasticity of substitution between an imported and domestic 
good. The parameter 𝜔𝐹𝐻 is the share of imported goods in the core consumption bundle. Now 
we have all the ingredients to define demand functions for each type of good. The demands for 
oil and core consumption good are defined as 
 




𝑂𝑡𝐶 = 𝜔𝑂𝐶 (𝑃𝑡𝑂𝑃𝑡 )−𝜈𝑂𝐶 𝐶𝑡         (7) 
 
The demands for foreign and home good are defined as 
 




𝐶𝑡𝐻 = (1 − 𝜔𝐹𝐻) (𝑃𝑡𝐻𝑃𝑡𝐶)−𝜈𝐹𝐻 𝐶𝑡𝐶        (9) 
 
where 𝑃𝑡, 𝑃𝑡𝑂, 𝑃𝑡𝐶 , 𝑃𝑡𝐹 and 𝑃𝑡𝐻 are prices for the respected consumption goods. Based on the 
consumption bundles we can define the overall inflation, 𝑃𝑡, as 
 




Analogous to the overall inflation, the core inflation, 𝑃𝑡𝐶 , is given by 
 
𝑃𝑡𝐶 = [𝜔𝐹𝐻(𝑃𝑡𝐹)1−𝜈𝐹𝐻 + (1 − 𝜔𝐹𝐻)(𝑃𝑡𝐻)1−𝜈𝐹𝐻] 11−𝜈𝐹𝐻      (11) 
 
Labour is differentiated over households meaning that each household is a monopoly supplier 
of a distinct variety of labour service, which implies that the households can determine their 
own wage (Erceg, Henderson and Levin, 2000; Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2005). In 
order to apply a wage stickiness à la Calvo into the model, households sell their labour service 
to a firm, which then transforms the labour service into a homogeneous input good 𝐿 using the 
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator 
 
𝐿𝑡 = [∫ 𝐿𝑡(𝑖)𝜈𝐿−1𝜈𝐿10 ] 𝜈𝐿𝜈𝐿−1         (12) 
 
The parameter 𝜈𝐿 represents the elasticity of substitution between varieties of labour. Firms 
take the input price of the 𝑖-th differentiated labour service as given, as well as the price of the 
homogeneous labour. The demand for labour is therefore defined as 
 𝐿𝑡(𝑖) = [𝑊𝑡(𝑖)𝑊𝑡 ]−𝜈𝐿 𝐿𝑡          (13) 
 
where 𝑊𝑡(𝑖) is the 𝑖-th household's wage, and 𝑊𝑡 is the aggregate wage that is given by 
 




Since households are monopoly suppliers of labour services, then each household has some 
decision power over the wage it charges, 𝑊𝑡(𝑖). We assume that not all households can set their 
wages optimally in every period. A household receives a random wage-change signal at a 
constant probability, 1 − 𝛼𝐿. In this case a household can set a new optimal wage, 𝑊𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑖). 
With probability, 𝛼𝐿, other households update their wage by indexation to the current numeraire 
inflation rate target, ?̅?𝑡, and previous period numeraire inflation rate, 𝜋𝑡𝑛𝑢𝑚 = 𝑃𝑡𝑛𝑢𝑚 𝑃𝑡−1𝑛𝑢𝑚⁄ . 
The household that cannot re-optimize in period 𝑡 will passively set its wage according to 
 𝑊𝑡+𝑘(𝑖) = (𝜋𝑡𝑛𝑢𝑚 … 𝜋𝑡+𝑘−1𝑛𝑢𝑚 )𝜑𝐿(?̅?𝑡+1 … ?̅?𝑡+𝑘)1−𝜑𝐿𝑊𝑡(𝑖)     (15) 
 
where the parameter 0 < 𝜑𝐿 < 1 is the degree of wage indexation to the previous period 
inflation rate. On the other hand, households, that are able to re-optimize their wage, face the 
following maximization problem 
 
𝐸𝑡 {∑ 𝛼𝐿𝑘∞𝑘=0 Λ𝑡,𝑡+𝑘 [𝑊𝑡+𝑘𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑖)(𝜋𝑡𝑛𝑢𝑚…𝜋𝑡+𝑘−1𝑛𝑢𝑚 )𝜑𝐿(?̅?𝑡+1…?̅?𝑡+𝑘)1−𝜑𝐿𝑃𝑡+𝑘𝑛𝑢𝑚 −𝜉𝑡(𝐿𝑡+𝑘(𝑖))𝜛(𝐶𝑡+𝑘ℎ𝐶𝑡+𝑘−1)] 𝐿𝑡+𝑘(𝑖)}       (16) 
 
where the expression Λ𝑡,𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛽 (𝐶𝑡 − ℎ𝐶𝑡−1) (𝐶𝑡+𝑘 − ℎ𝐶𝑡+𝑘−1)⁄  represents a discount factor 






2.2 Domestic Firms 
 
We have a continuum of representative domestic good firms indexed by 𝑗𝜖(0,1) which operate 
in a monopolistic competition environment. They maximize their profits by choosing their 
optimal Calvo (1983) price of their product variety 𝑗. The corresponding demand and the 
technology is given by 
 
𝑌𝑡𝐻(𝑗) = 𝑍𝑡𝐻 [𝜔𝑂𝐿1𝜈𝑂𝐿(𝑂𝑡𝐻(𝑗))𝜈𝑂𝐿−1𝜈𝑂𝐿 + (1 − 𝜔𝑂𝐿)(𝐿𝑡𝐻(𝑗))𝜈𝑂𝐿−1𝜈𝑂𝐿 ] 𝜈𝑂𝐿𝜈𝑂𝐿−1    (17) 
 
where 𝑌𝑡𝐻 is the quantity of a particular variety of home good, while 𝑍𝑡𝐻 is a productivity shock 
in the home goods sector and is the same for all firms with the exogenous innovation 𝜀𝑡𝐴. The 
variables 𝑂𝑡𝐻(𝑗) and 𝐿𝑡𝐻(𝑗) are the oil input and labour input in the production process of a 
particular variety of home produced good. The parameter 𝜔𝑂𝐿 represenents the share of oil in 
the production process, while the parameter 𝜈𝑂𝐿 is the elasticity of substitution between the oil 
and labour inputs. 
 
From the first order condition, we can obtain the optimal mix of both production inputs, so that 
 




Based on the minimization problem defined in the equation (17) we get the expression for the 
nominal marginal costs that depend on the prices of both production inputs and the productivity 
process7 
 
𝑀𝐶𝑡𝐻 = 1𝑍𝑡𝐻 [𝜔𝑂𝐿(𝑃𝑡𝑂)1−𝜈𝑂𝐿 + (1 − 𝜔𝑂𝐿)(𝑊𝑡)1−𝜈𝑂𝐿] 11−𝜈𝑂𝐿     (19) 
 
Similarly as in the labour market sector, we assume that a fraction of firms (1 − 𝛼𝐻) can reset 
their prices while the others 𝛼𝐻 set their price accordingly to the indexation rule (Calvo, 1983). 
If a firm receives the price-changing signal then it maximizes the optimal price 𝑃𝑡𝐻,𝑜𝑝𝑡 
 
𝐸𝑡 ∑ (𝛽𝛼𝐻)𝑘∞𝑘=0 Λ𝑡,𝑡+𝑘 [𝑃𝑡+𝑘𝐻,𝑜𝑝𝑡(𝑗)(𝜋𝑡𝐻…𝜋𝑡+𝑘−1𝐻 )𝜑𝐻(?̅?𝑡+1…?̅?𝑡+𝑘)1−𝜑𝐻−𝑀𝐶𝑡+𝑘𝐻𝑃𝑡+𝑘𝑛𝑢𝑚 𝑌𝑡+𝑘𝐻 (𝑗)]  (20) 
 
subject to the demand of the variety of 𝑗 product 
 
𝐶𝑡𝐻(𝑗) = [𝑃𝑡𝐻(𝑖)𝑃𝑡𝐻 ]−𝜈𝐻 (𝐶𝑡𝐻 + 𝐶𝑡𝐻,∗)        (21) 
 
where the parameter 𝜈𝐻 denotes the price elasticity of the demand of a variety of good 𝑗. The 
variable 𝐶𝑡𝐻,∗ is the foreign demand for home goods. The inflation variable 𝜋𝑡𝐻 is defined by 
home good prices 𝑃𝑡𝐻 𝑃𝑡−1𝐻⁄ . The other firms set their price accordingly to the passive indexation 
rule 
 
                                                 
7 The nominal marginal cost depends only on the prices of inputs (oil prices and wages) and the technology level, 
which is common for all firms. Therefore, the marginal cost is independent from the scale of production of a 
particular firm (Medina and Soto, 2005). In this case, the (external) supply of oil is not defined, while the oil-prices 
are modelled as an exogenous 𝐴𝑅(1) process. 
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𝑃𝑡+𝑘𝐻 (𝑗) = (𝜋𝑡𝐻 … 𝜋𝑡+𝑘−1𝐻 )𝜑𝐻(?̅?𝑡+1 … ?̅?𝑡+𝑘)1−𝜑𝐻𝑃𝑡𝐻(𝑖)     (22) 
 
where 0 < 𝜑𝐻 < 1 is the inflation indexation parameter. In the end we specify the profits that 
a 𝑗-th firm follows 
 Π𝑡(𝑗) = 𝑃𝑡𝐻(𝑖)𝑌𝑡𝐻(𝑖) − 𝑃𝑡𝑂𝑂𝑡𝐻(𝑗) − 𝑊𝑡𝐿𝑡𝐻(𝑗)       (23) 
 
2.3 Foreign economy 
 
The foreign economy consists of the demand for home produced goods8 
 
𝐶𝑡𝐻,∗ = 𝜔𝐹𝐻,∗ [𝑃𝑡𝐻,∗𝑃𝑡𝐹,∗]−𝜈𝐻,∗ 𝐶𝑡∗         (24) 
 
where the parameter 𝜔𝐹𝐻,∗ represents the share of the domestic intermediate goods in the 
consumption basket abroad, while 𝜈𝐻,∗ is the price elasticity of demand. The assumption is that 
domestic firms do not discriminate between prices across markets. Consequently the law of one 
price holds, so that 𝑃𝑡𝐻,∗ = 𝑃𝑡𝐻. Since the modelled small open economy operates in a monetary 
union the real exchange rate is just a relative price between foreign and home price index, so 
that 
 
𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑡 ≡ 𝑃𝑡𝐹,∗𝑃𝑡𝑛𝑢𝑚           (25) 
 
                                                 
8 For simplicity reasons we leave out the exportable commodity good sector, which is defined in Medina and Soto 
(2005) alongside the foreign demand for home produced good. 
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In the real exchange rate equation we assume that the foreign consumption bundle does not 
include oil consumption, and that the size of 𝜔𝐹𝐻,∗ is too small to affect the foreign inflation. 
Foreign inflation, however, is subject to a 𝐴𝑅(1) process with the exogenous innovation 𝜀𝑡𝑃∗. 
Based on this we have to define the relative domestic price of oil. The expression is given by 
 
𝑃𝑡𝑂𝑃𝑡𝑛𝑢𝑚 = 𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑡 𝑃𝑡𝑂,∗𝑃𝑡𝐹,∗ (1 + 𝜏𝑡𝑂)         (26) 
 
The variable 𝜏𝑡𝑂 corresponds to deviations from the law of one price in the relative oil price, 
due to excise duty tax on oil prices. Additionally the domestic relative oil price depends on the 




The fiscal block follows the Almeida (2009) and Almeida et al. (2011) papers, but we add the 
extension of an excise duty tax rule. The government's activity is based on the acquisition of 
the government's consumption good, 𝐺𝑡, payment of debt, (𝑅𝑡−1 − 1)𝐵𝑡, and household 
transfers, 𝑇𝑅𝑡. On the other side, the government finances itself by collecting value added tax, 
excise duty tax on oil consumption and income tax, 𝜏𝑡𝐶𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡𝑂𝑃𝑡𝑂𝑂𝑡 + 𝜏𝐿 ∫ 𝑊𝑡(𝑖)𝐿𝑡10 (𝑖)di, 
and debt issuance, 𝐵𝑡. The variables 𝐺𝑡 and 𝜏𝑡𝐶  are modelled as 𝐴𝑅(1) processes with 𝜀𝑡𝐺  and 𝜀𝑡𝜏𝐶 being the respected exogenous innovations. Government spending 𝐺𝑡 also depends on 𝜏𝑡𝑂, 
so that  




The intuition behind the equation (27) is to introduce the trade-off the government makes when 
it tries to put less pressure on the inflation as the oil-price shock occurs with respect to a 
decrease in its spending. Continuing, we get the government's primary deficit 
 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚 = 𝑃𝑡𝐺𝑡 + 𝑇𝑅𝑡 − 𝜏𝑡𝐶𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡 − 𝜏𝑡𝑂𝑃𝑡𝑂𝑂𝑡 − 𝜏𝐿 ∫ 𝑊𝑡(𝑖)𝐿𝑡10 (𝑖)di   (28) 
 
We allow for the excise duty tax on oil consumption 𝜏𝑡𝑂 to vary over time so that 
 𝜏𝑡𝑂 = 𝜌𝜏𝜏𝑡−1𝑂 − (1 − 𝜌𝜏)𝛾𝑂?̅?𝑡𝑂,∗ + 𝜀𝑡𝜏𝑂       (29) 
 
This feature helps the fiscal part of the economy to curb the effects of the dynamics of global 
oil prices, ?̅?𝑡𝑂,∗ = 𝑃𝑡𝑂,∗ 𝑃𝑡𝑛𝑢𝑚⁄ , on the domestic economy via excise duty tax rule. Jakab, Baksa 
and Benk (2010) implemented a similar tax rule; however, they introduce a general tax rule 
based on the GDP gap. The idea behind the excise duty tax rule is that when global oil prices 
rise the government decreases the excise duty tax on oil consumption by (1 − 𝜌𝜏)𝛾𝑂 amount. 
The parameter 𝜌𝜏 is an autoregressive parameter with respect to the past values of excise duty 
tax on oil consumption 𝜏𝑡−1𝑂 . The parameter 𝛾𝑂 is the response parameter that changes the excise 
duty tax when global oil prices change. This way the government decreases the oil-price 
increase pressure on the firms and households. On the other hand, the lower excise duty tax 
income decreases the government spending and thus decreases the aggregate output. Adding 
interest outlays, we get the government's total deficit 




The government's budget constraint is defined by equalling government's resources and 
expenditures, such that 
 𝐵𝑡+1 + 𝜏𝑡𝐶𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡𝑂𝑃𝑡𝑂,∗𝑂𝑡 + 𝜏𝐿 ∫ 𝑊𝑡(𝑖)𝐿𝑡10 (𝑖)di = 𝑃𝑡𝐺𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡−1𝐵𝑡 + 𝑇𝑅𝑡  
 (31) 
 
and such that 
 𝐵𝑡+1 = 𝐵𝑡 + 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑡          (32) 
 
In order to prevent explosiveness of the debt path a fiscal rule has to be imposed by restricting 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚 with endogenously adjusting 𝑇𝑅𝑡 and ensuring that the debt-to-GDP ratio converges 
to a stable long-term value. The rule is given by  
 
𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑔𝑑?̂? = −𝜈𝑔 (𝐵𝑡+1𝑔𝑑?̂? − ( 𝐵𝑔𝑑?̂?̅̅ ̅̅ ))        (33) 
 
where 𝐵 𝑔𝑑?̂?⁄̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ stands for the target value of the stationary debt-to-GDP ratio. The parameter 𝜈𝑔 
is the government’s response parameter to the compliance of the debt-to-GDP ratio. The idea 
behind the fiscal rule is that whenever the debt-to-GDP ratio rises above the target value, the 
transfers to households, 𝑇𝑅𝑡, automatically decrease, in order to reduce the government's 





2.5 Monetary policy 
 
Monetary policy interest rate is modelled as a Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) and determines the 
interest rate for both economies operating in the monetary union 
 𝑅𝑡∗ = 𝜌𝑅𝑅𝑡−1∗ + (1 − 𝜌𝑅)(𝛾𝜋𝜋𝑡∗ + 𝛾𝑦𝐶𝑡∗) + 𝜀𝑡𝑀𝑃      (34) 
 
Variable 𝜀𝑡𝑀𝑃 represents an exogenous monetary policy shock. For the output gap, we assume 
that foreign demand 𝐶𝑡∗ is large enough in comparison to the Slovene economy, so that the 
Slovene aggregate production would not significantly affect both economies together. Foreign 
demand 𝐶𝑡∗ and inflation, 𝜋𝑡∗, are assumed to be exogenous 𝐴𝑅(1) processes with innovations 𝜀𝑡𝑌𝐹  and 𝜀𝑡𝑃∗, respectively. 
 
2.6 Market clearing 
 
In the composite good market, supply of domestically produced good must satisfy the all types 
of demand 
 𝑌𝑡𝐻 = 𝐶𝑡𝐻 + 𝐶𝑡𝐻,∗ + 𝐺𝑡         (35) 
 
The labour market implies that demand equals supply of labour 




From the aggregate budget constraint of households, we obtain an expression for the aggregate 
accumulation of international bonds 
 
𝐵𝑡∗𝑅𝑡∗Θ( 𝐵𝑡∗𝑃𝑡𝑋𝑋𝑡)𝑃𝑡𝑛𝑢𝑚 = 𝐵𝑡−1∗𝑃𝑡𝑛𝑢𝑚 + 𝑃𝑡𝑋𝑃𝑡𝑛𝑢𝑚 𝑋𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡𝑀𝑃𝑡𝑛𝑢𝑚 𝑀𝑡       (37) 
 
The total value of exports depends on the foreign demand for domestically produced goods 
 
𝑃𝑡𝑋𝑃𝑡𝑛𝑢𝑚 𝑋𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡𝐻𝑃𝑡𝑛𝑢𝑚 𝐶𝑡𝐻,∗          (38) 
 
On the other hand the value of imports depends on the real exchange rate and the domestic 
demand for foreign goods and demand for oil and is given by 
 
𝑃𝑡𝑀𝑃𝑡𝑛𝑢𝑚 𝑀𝑡 = 𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑡𝐶𝑡𝐹 + 𝑃𝑡𝑂,∗𝑃𝑡𝑛𝑢𝑚 𝑂𝑡        (39) 
 
where 𝑂𝑡 = 𝑂𝑡𝐶 + 𝑂𝑡𝐻 represents the total oil imports, comprised by household oil consumption 
and oil inputs in the home economy production process. We are left with the definition of the 
GDP, which is given then by 
 





3. Calibration of the model 
 
The key calibrated parameters are set with the intention of suiting the model as close as possible 
to the economy characteristics of interest - Slovenia, and at the same time are not of interest of 
the estimation process. The calibrated parameters are set according to already known empirical 
facts and national statistics data. The inverse of the elasticity of work effort (Frisch elasticity), 𝜛, is set to 1. The remaining parameters are: the discount factor,  𝛽, is set to 0.995, while the 
degree of habit persistence is ℎ = 0.85. The target debt-to-GDP ratio, ?̂? 𝑔𝑑?̂?⁄̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, is set to 0.6, 
which is in-line with the Maastricht criteria. The other macro-related parameters relate to long-
term averages and are set accordingly to the data from the Statistical Office of Republic of 
Slovenia (SORS). Government spending relative to the GDP is set to 17%, while net exports 
are set to 0.5%. The import share of goods in the consumption basket, 𝜔𝐹𝐻, takes the value of 
0.5, while the share of oil in the total consumption basket, 𝜔𝑂𝐶, and the share of oil in the 
production process, 𝜔𝑂𝐿, take the value of 0.06. The Calvo wage parameter 𝛼𝐻 is set to 0.875, 
while the wage indexation parameter 𝜑𝐻 is set to 0.5. The elasticities of substitution between 
the same varieties of goods, 𝜈𝐻, and labour, 𝜈𝐿, are set to 11. Since Slovenia is a small open 
economy operating in a monetary union (i.e. without a significant effect on the monetary policy 
decision), we set the inflation and output interest rate response parameters to 𝛾𝜋 = 1.5 and 𝛾𝑦 =0.1 (Taylor rule parameters), close to Fourçans and Vranceanu (2004) estimated parameters for 
the euro area. 
 
4. Estimation and results 
 
In this subsection Bayesian estimation results of the model are presented. The parameters of 
our interest are estimated with Bayesian methods. Bayesian inference starts from setting out 
prior distributions of the model's parameters, which are not calibrated. In more detail, the prior 
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distributions describe the available information priors. Then we observe the available statistical 
data in order to update the information prior with Bayes theorem, and obtain posterior 
distributions of the model's parameters. The dataset spanning from 2002Q1 to 2017Q3 in this 
process is comprised of Slovene quarterly data: real GDP, real government spending, 
employment, excise duty tax rate, core inflation and HICP inflation. 9 We also add quarterly 
time series for the euro area real GDP. The original statistical series are not stationary; therefore, 
the stationarity of the data has to be imposed first by log differentiating and demeaning of the 
data. The data enters the model as percent deviation from the steady state. The Metropolis-
Hastings MCMC algorithm is used with 1.000.000 steps and two sequential chains with the 
acceptance rate per chain at a rate of 33.7%. 
 
The results of the prior and posterior distribution of the estimated parameters and shocks are 
shown in Table 1. Looking at the estimation results, all the shocks are relatively persistent. The 
persistence parameters of shocks are denoted by parameters 𝜌. Their values are mostly 
estimated to be between 0.65 and 0.8. While none of the shocks is excessively persistent, but 
are in-line with the existing literature (for example Forni et al., 2015; Smets and Wouters, 
2003). The elasticities of substitution between oil and non-oil products, 𝜈𝑂𝐶, and factors, 𝜈𝑂𝐿, 
as expected exhibit low values, suggesting that oil is very inelastic. Inelasticity of oil is widely 
empirically documented (Miyazawa, 2009; Caldara, Cavallo and Iacoviello, 2016). What is 
more interesting is the estimate of the response parameter of excise duty tax rule, 𝛾𝑂. It takes 
the value of 0.0966. If we consider the persistence parameter of the excise duty tax rule, 𝜌𝜏𝑂 , 
than by simple algebra we can conclude that the government’s reaction to a 1 p.p. increase in 
global oil price, the excise duty tax rate decreases by 0.025 p.p.. More on the effects of oil 
shocks are presented in the next section where we analyse impulse response functions. 
                                                 
9 Sources: Eurostat, SORS and ECB. 
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Table 1. Prior and posterior distribution of the estimated parameters and shocks 
Parameter Prior mode Posterior mode 90% HPD interval Type of prior Prior distribution 𝜸𝑶 0.1000 0.0966 0.0498 0.1420 beta 0.0300 𝜸𝑮 0.1000 0.0929 0.0462 0.1371 beta 0.0300 𝝂𝑭𝑯 1.0000 0.8497 0.7037 0.9899 gamma 0.1000 𝝂𝑶𝑪 0.1000 0.0807 0.0421 0.1189 gamma 0.0300 𝝂𝑶𝑳 0.1000 0.0956 0.0495 0.1407 gamma 0.0300 𝝂𝑭𝑯,∗ 1.0000 0.6925 0.5618 0.8165 gamma 0.1000 𝝋𝑯 0.7500 0.1658 0.0950 0.2328 beta 0.1000 𝜶𝑯 0.7500 0.7263 0.6536 0.8021 beta 0.1000 𝝆𝑷∗ 0.7500 0.7794 0.7219 0.8405 beta 0.0700 𝝆𝑨 0.7500 0.7165 0.5626 0.8747 beta 0.1000 𝝆𝑷𝑶,∗ 0.7500 0.6548 0.4964 0.8154 beta 0.1000 𝝆𝒀𝑭 0.7500 0.7322 0.5731 0.8952 beta 0.1000 𝝆𝝉𝑶 0.7500 0.7473 0.603 0.8995 beta 0.1000 𝝆𝑮 0.7500 0.7639 0.6177 0.9124 beta 0.1000 𝝆𝝉𝑪 0.7500 0.7928 0.6539 0.9383 beta 0.1000 𝝔𝑹 0.7500 0.6998 0.6947 0.7049 beta 0.1000 𝜺𝑴𝑷 0.4000 0.4020 0.3225 0.4796 inv. gamma 0.1000 𝜺𝑷∗ 0.5000 0.1341 0.1148 0.1530 inv. gamma 0.2000 𝜺𝑨 0.7000 0.2148 0.1857 0.2435 inv. gamma 0.2000 𝜺𝑷𝑶,∗ 0.5000 0.3265 0.2204 0.4269 inv. gamma 0.2000 𝜺𝒀𝑭 0.7000 0.2150 0.1862 0.2438 inv. gamma 0.2000 𝜺𝝉𝑶 0.5000 0.1192 0.1027 0.1355 inv. gamma 0.2000 𝜺𝑮 1.0000 0.4092 0.3549 0.4614 inv. gamma 0.2000 𝜺𝝉𝑪 1.0000 0.4185 0.3631 0.4724 inv. gamma 0.2000 
Source: author’s calculations 
 
5. Impulse response functions and the historical shock decomposition 
 
Figure 1 shows the contributions of the exogenous shocks onto the overall inflation through 
time. It is evident, that the inflation in Slovenia was influenced by global oil price dynamics. 
During the 2006-2008 boom period in Slovenia the global oil prices positively contributed to 
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the Slovene inflation as the global economy was in a large upswing. The Slovene inflation 
drastically decreased as the global financial crisis hit at the second half of the 2008. As the 
global economy rebounded from the first wave of the global financial crisis, so did the global 
oil prices as they again positively contributed to the Slovene inflation in 2010 and the beginning 
of 2011. The 2011 and 2012 were characterised by the European sovereign crisis which affected 
the global demand for crude oil. This is shown by the negative contribution of oil-price shocks 
on the Slovene inflation. The negative contribution of oil-price shocks continued in the next 
years as the global oil prices continued to fall in 2014 and 2015. Only with the start of 2016 the 
pattern of positive oil-price shocks on the Slovene inflation emerged again, which is in line with 
the global oil-price dynamics as the emerging economies increased the global demand. 
 
Figure 1. Historical decomposition of oil and other shocks on inflation (y-o-y growth rate in percent) 
 
*Note: The contribution of other shocks are the sum of the initial values and shocks 𝜀𝑀𝑃, 𝜀𝑃∗, 𝜀𝐴, , 𝜀𝜏𝑂, 𝜀𝑌𝐹 , 𝜀𝐺, and 𝜀𝜏𝐶. 
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Going deeper into the analysis, the impulse response functions are depicted and assess how the 
key macroeconomic variables react to shocks induced to the modelled economy. In applied 
work namely, it is often of our interest to study the response of one variable to an exogenous 
impulse in another variable. Impulse response describes the evolution of the variable of interest 
along a specified time horizon after a shock in a given moment. The impulse responses of the 
exogenous shocks in the following figure depict a 30-period horizon. It is not, however, our 
objective to thoroughly analyse the simulated economy's impulse responses to all defined 
shocks, thus we limit the analysis to the response of macroeconomic variables only to the oil-
price shock and the shock to the tax rate of the excise duty tax on energy products. 
 
According to our model, it seems that foreign oil-price shocks can play a significant role in 
driving the macroeconomic dynamics in Slovenia. To show the effect of changing global oil-
price dynamics, we analyse a 1 percentage point (p.p.) ex-ante increase in global oil prices. The 
effects of this shock are displayed in Figure 2, representing the impulse responses of the main 
macroeconomic variables to the global oil-price shock. The rise in global oil prices causes oil 
imports to decline for 0.1 p.p. from the steady state. On the other side the price of oil goods 
increases for 1 p.p., making the whole economy worse off as the real aggregate output, 
consumption of all type of goods, overall imports, exports, labour and wages decrease. At the 
same time the inflation increases marginally as it mostly depends on the weight of oil goods in 
the inflation basket. When an oil-price shock occurs the primary deficit decreases as well. There 
are two reasons for it. First, the overall cooldown of the economic activity indirectly decreases 
the government's income side via lower overall tax revenues. Second, the excise duty tax rule 
responds to an increase in oil prices and thus directly decreases the excise duty tax rate. 
Comparing the impulse responses of the oil-price shock to the existing literature, it closely 
matches the responses to a negative oil-price shock done by Forni et al. (2015) as they estimated 
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the effect of the oil-price shock to the euro area economy. The excise duty tax rate on oil 
products immediately decreases as the government acts counter-cyclically to the dynamics of 
global oil prices.  
 
Figure 2. Impulse responses of the macroeconomic variables to a 1 p.p. foreign oil price shock 
(deviations from steady state) 
 
Source: author’s calculations 
 
Figure 3 represents the impulse responses of the macroeconomic variables to a 1 p.p. increase 
of the excise duty tax rate on oil prices. By doing this we show the effects of the government’s 
decision of raising the excise duty tax rate on the economy. As expected the increase in the 
excise duty tax rate on oil products has similar effects as the global oil-price shocks – the cost-
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push type shocks.10 The inflation increases, as well as the domestic oil prices. On the other side 
the aggregate output, consumption, exports, imports, wages and labour decrease.  
 
Figure 3. Impulse responses of the macroeconomic variables to a 1 p.p. excise duty tax on oil prices 
shock (deviations from steady state) 
 
Source: author’s calculations 
 
Against this backdrop we provide three different scenarios by changing the value of the excise 
duty tax parameter. Having obtained the estimated values of the model parameters we continue 
with a comparison of the impulse responses of the main macroeconomic variables by fixing all 
                                                 
10 Implementation of an excise duty tax rate shock was intended to show the similarities between the oil-price and 
the excise duty tax rate shock that both have on the economy. In this manner, a government should be cautious in 
adjusting the excise duty tax rate, especially if the government decides to increase the tax rate. Nonetheless, the 
main contribution of the paper is to introduce the excise duty tax rule that offsets hikes in oil-price fluctuations 
and volatility.  
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the parameters to an estimated value and changing the value of the excise duty tax response 
parameter 𝛾𝑂. The solid line in Figure 4 represents the responses of the variables when 𝛾𝑂 is set 
to the estimated value of 0.0966. The dashed line represents the responses of the variables when 𝛾𝑂 is calibrated to 0 and the dotted line represents the responses of the variables when 𝛾𝑂 is 
calibrated to 1. This way we provide two additional calibrated values of the excise duty tax rate 
response parameter 𝛾𝑂. The distinction of implementing the excise duty tax rule is evident in 
our case. If the government does not respond to an oil-price shock by increasing the excise duty 
tax rate (when 𝛾𝑂 = 0), the domestic economy faces a stagflation, as the overall inflation 
increases while output, consumption, real wages, exports and imports (oil and non-oil goods) 
decrerase. On the other hand, if the government accommodates the excise duty tax rate by 
considering the excise duty tax rule (when 𝛾𝑂 > 0), the government’s fiscal policy is able to 
steer the increase of global oil prices away from the overall inflation. The harder the government 
tries to offset the oil-price shock, the better it is for the economy, especially inflation-wise. Oil-
price shocks have lower negative effects on real wages and employment of households, since 
the inflation increases less than in the absence of the counter-cyclical excise duty tax rule. 
Consequently, real consumption of every type decreases less in the case of more aggressive 
fiscal accommodation of the excise duty tax parameter (𝛾𝑂 = 1). The same applies for real 
output, exports and imports. On the other hand, if the government is highly aggressive (i.e. 𝛾𝑂 = 1), it has to increase its budget deficit in order to offset the negative oil-price shocks, 





Figure 4. Impulse responses of the inflation variables to a 1 p.p. foreign oil-price shock with changing 
government excise duty parameter (deviations from steady state) 
 






In this paper a DSGE model is estimated on Slovene economy data. The main contribution of 
the paper aims to fill the gap by studying the effects of oil-price shocks in a small open economy 
model setting integrated in a single monetary union, namely the euro area, and introducing a 
concise government sector with excise duty tax rule for oil related products. The structure of 
the model is set in a typical small open economy fashion, where firms and households are 
assumed to adjust prices and wages à la Calvo, respectively. The different composition of the 
goods bundle allows for the changing demands of different types of goods that are affected by 
different price setting. By using Bayesian inference methodology the key parameters of interest 
are estimated.  
 
The results show that global oil-price shocks can still have large effects on the Slovene 
economy. The fiscal policy authority has the power to offset the pressure that the oil-price 
shocks have onto the overall inflation by counter-cyclically regulate the excise duty tax rate on 
oil products. However, this comes at a cost. Decreased tax income decreases government 
spending and increases the budget deficit, if the government chooses not to decrease its 
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Appendix A: Prior and posterior distribution 
 











Appendix B: Exogenous shocks 
 
Figure B1. Exogenous shocks 
 
 
 
